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EXITING CUSTOM: ANALOGIES TO TREATY 
WITHDRAWALS 
LAURENCE R. HELFER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Withdrawing from International Custom,1 Professors Bradley and 
Gulati advance a pair of novel and thought-provoking arguments: first, that 
the conventional wisdom that states may never unilaterally withdraw from 
customary international law (“CIL”) is not supported by historical practice 
or the writings of key international law publicists; and second, that 
permitting such withdrawals in certain circumstances is preferable to a 
categorical preclusion of unilateral exits. This Essay begins where the 
authors’ second argument leaves off. It analyzes the rules governing 
unilateral withdrawals from and denunciations of multilateral treaties and 
considers the insights they offer for understanding how a “default view” 
that permits states to withdraw from CIL might function in practice.2 
My objectives for undertaking this analysis are twofold. First, Bradley 
and Gulati rely heavily on the divergent treatment of treaties and custom in 
support of their second claim. Drawing upon Exiting Treaties, my previous 
study of the design and use of treaty denunciation and withdrawal clauses,3 
I shed additional light on this analogy by illustrating how the law of treaties 
regulates unilateral exit. Second, I hope to alleviate the concerns of 
 
 * Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law and Co-director, Center for International and 
Comparative Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to Curt Bradley, Mitu Gulati, and Anthea 
Roberts for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 
(2010) [hereinafter Withdrawing from International Custom]. 
 2. This Essay does not, however, address an important antecedent question: is it appropriate to 
analogize between treaties and custom? The answer to this question depends, in part, on whether the 
two sources of international law serve similar or different functions. For a thoughtful argument that CIL 
serves distinctive communitarian functions that weigh against convergence with the law of treaties, see 
generally Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(b)? A Reply to Bradley and Gulati, 21 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 173 (2010). A second issue this Essay does not consider is the transition costs of 
shifting from the mandatory view to the default view. These costs may be considerable, and uncertainty 
over the transition process may create incentives for opportunistic behavior. See id. (manuscript at 11) 
(on file with author). A fully developed proposal for a default view of CIL must address both of these 
topics. For a preliminary analysis, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary 
International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
 3. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005). 
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commentators who oppose a default view of custom on the ground that it 
would allow states simply to walk away from preexisting legal 
commitments to other nations. As I explain below, if the rules governing 
unilateral withdrawal from CIL were to track those governing unilateral 
withdrawal from treaties, states would be subject to a wide array of 
procedural and substantive constraints on their ability to exit from 
international laws they no longer intend to follow.4 My analysis of these 
constraints is based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,5 on 
reports of the International Law Commission leading to the Convention’s 
adoption,6 on state practice concerning treaty denunciations and 
withdrawals, and on relevant international judicial rulings. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the 
procedural limitations on treaty denunciations, including the obligation to 
act in good faith, the requirement to provide reasonable notice of an intent 
to withdraw, and the possibility for a state to offer a justification for its 
decision to quit a treaty. Part I also considers how these procedural 
limitations might be transposed to CIL. 
Part II analyzes the substantive constraints on treaty denunciations. 
The issues addressed include the presumption against partial exits and the 
possibility of withdrawing from treaties that contain no provisions 
governing denunciation or withdrawal. The latter issue is especially 
germane to identifying which subjects of CIL should be amenable to 
unilateral exit, and to fashioning a default rule for custom that permits 
withdrawal in some areas but not others. 
Part III analyzes the legal consequences of exit. The denunciation of a 
multilateral treaty terminates the withdrawing state’s legal obligations 
under the treaty. Such an action does not, however, affect the country’s 
responsibility for violations that occurred before the denunciation takes 
effect. To the contrary, the withdrawing state remains responsible not only 
for those violations but also for their continuing effects.  
 
 4. Cf. Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123 (2005), ¶ 56 (Mar. 11, 
2005) (Trindade, Judge, concurring) (“[N]ot even the institution of denunciation of treaties is so 
absolute in effects as one might prima facie tend to assume.”). 
 5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. 
 6. See, e.g. Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/107 (1957), reprinted in [1957] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 16 [hereinafter Second 
Fitzmaurice Report]; Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 36 [hereinafter Second 
Waldock Report]. 
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I. PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXIT FROM  
TREATIES AND CIL 
Good faith is the fundamental ground norm upon which the entire law 
of treaties is constructed. It applies not only to the creation and 
performance of international legal obligations but also to their termination.7 
As applied to unilateral denunciations and withdrawals, however, the good 
faith principle raises a number of distinctive issues. 
Most multilateral treaties contain broad and permissive withdrawal 
clauses that do not condition exit upon the consent of other states parties or 
review by international tribunals.8 This creates difficulties where the 
parties’ performances occur at different times. In particular, the clauses 
raise the possibility that the denouncing state could obtain the benefits of 
performance by other treaty members and then withdraw prior to carrying 
out its own performance. Many multilateral agreements address this risk by 
precluding exit during a designated number of years following a treaty’s 
entry into force, and/or by providing that a notification of denunciation or 
withdrawal takes effect only after a specified number of months or years 
has passed.9 The former provision allows all parties to incur the costs of 
implementing the agreement without fear that their treaty partners will “cut 
and run.” The latter clause narrows the window for asynchronous 
performance and thereby diminishes the incentive for one state 
opportunistically to appropriate benefits that should accrue to all treaty 
parties.10 
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua case,11 the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) applied the good faith principle to a 
closely analogous issue: whether the United States could revise its 
declaration recognizing the court’s compulsory jurisdiction, which 
provided that it would “remain in force for a period of five years and 
thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be given to 
 
 7. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, 267 (July 
8) (advisory opinion); MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 769 (2009). 
 8. See Helfer, supra note 3, at 1598-99; VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 703-04. 
 9. See Helfer, supra note 3, at 1596-99 (analyzing variation in treaty exit clauses). 
 10. See Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and 
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (1999); Edward T. Swaine, 
Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2074 (2003). 
 11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1984 I.C. J. 392 
(Nov. 26). 
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terminate this declaration.”12 Three days before Nicaragua filed an 
application with the ICJ, the United States modified its declaration to 
exclude all disputes with Central American nations. The modification 
further provided that it “shall take effect immediately.”13 These revisions, 
the United States asserted, deprived the court of jurisdiction over a dispute 
involving Nicaragua. The ICJ rejected this argument. It reasoned that the 
United States had “assumed an inescapable obligation towards other 
States . . . by stating formally and solemnly that any [change to its 
declaration] should take effect only after six months have elapsed as from 
the date of notice.”14 The court also gave short shrift to the United States’ 
attempt to invoke, on reciprocity grounds, Nicaragua’s declaration 
recognizing the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. That declaration did not 
contain any notice period prior to withdrawal. It was therefore, according to 
the United States, “liable to immediate termination, without previous 
notice.” Again, the ICJ disagreed: 
[T]he right of immediate termination of declarations with indefinite 
duration is far from established. It appears from the requirements of 
good faith that they should be treated, by analogy, according to the law 
of treaties, which requires a reasonable time for withdrawal from or 
termination of treaties that contain no provision regarding the duration 
of their validity. Since Nicaragua has in fact not manifested any 
intention to withdraw its own declaration, the question of what 
reasonable period of notice would legally be required does not need to 
be further examined: it need only be observed that from 6 to 9 April 
would not amount to a “reasonable time”.15 
The ICJ’s reasoning implies that notice provisions and other 
procedural restrictions on treaty exits should be strictly construed. Such a 
result is fully consistent with the ground norm of good faith, with respect 
for the parties’ bargain (which encompasses both the form of international 
agreements and their substance),16 and with the goal of discouraging 
opportunistic defections that may cause treaty-based cooperation to 
unravel. 
These same principles can be applied “by analogy” to withdrawals 
from international custom. But the translation of these principles raises 
conceptual challenges. The two canonical elements of CIL—state practice 
 
 12. Id. ¶ 13. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. ¶ 61. 
 15. Id. ¶ 63. 
 16. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 
(2005). 
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and opinio juris—both relate to the substance of an evolving customary 
rule. Governments generally do not express their views concerning a rule’s 
procedural aspects, including those relating to withdrawal. For this reason, 
CIL most closely resembles multilateral treaties that neither expressly 
provide for denunciation or withdrawal nor expressly preclude it. Exit from 
these agreements is governed by Article 56 of the Vienna Convention. I 
discuss the substantive dimension of Article 56 below. Here I focus on the 
article’s procedural clause, which requires a state to “give not less than 
twelve months’ notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw . . . .”17 
The rationale for this provision, which purportedly reflects state 
practice, is to provide a notice period that “is sufficiently long to give 
adequate protection to the interests of the other parties and to enable further 
negotiations.”18 To this one might add the virtues of a bright line rule that 
enables all treaty members to plan their behavior in advance of any 
particular instance of exit. 
Under the default view of CIL withdrawals that Bradley and Gulati 
propose, these same policies should inform both the length of the notice 
period and the procedures for providing notice. Multilateral agreements 
designate depositories to circulate notifications to other states parties. CIL 
contains no such institutional infrastructure. In earlier centuries, the 
absence of a formal mechanism for disseminating a state’s notice of 
withdrawal might have supported a default notice period of more than one 
year. The twenty-first century’s pervasive digital technologies make such 
an extension unnecessary. But those technologies also facilitate the ability 
of foreign ministry officials to inform their counterparts in countries bound 
by an existing custom, which in most instances include all or nearly all 
members of the international community. Thus, to satisfy the good faith 
requirement, a state seeking to absent itself from an existing rule of CIL 
should, at a minimum, expressly and directly notify every nation that may 
plausibly claim to be adversely affected by the withdrawal, and otherwise 
widely publicize its intent to withdraw on a date certain at least one year in 
the future. 
There is weaker support for precluding unilateral withdrawal in the 
years immediately following the formation of a new custom. Prohibitions 
on denunciations during a treaty’s early years are found in many 
multilateral agreements. But they are far less common than the requirement 
 
 17. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 56(2). 
 18. VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 704; cf. Withdrawing from International Custom, supra note 1, at 
258-59 ( “[A] reasonable notice period might be imposed [prior to withdrawal from CIL] in situations 
in which reliance interest are at stake.”). 
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to provide at least twelve months notice prior to exit. In addition, states 
may persistently object to an emerging custom to prevent its application to 
them. Given the widely acknowledged difficulty of identifying the precise 
moment when emerging state practice and opinio juris crystallize into 
legally binding custom,19 a rule permitting withdrawal prior to that moment 
but categorically precluding it for a period of years thereafter would be 
impractical and difficult to enforce. 
Does the good faith principle also require a withdrawing state to 
explain why it is opting out of CIL? The analogy to treaties suggests a 
negative answer. “The overwhelming majority of the denunciation and 
withdrawal clauses . . . do not require a state to provide any justification for 
its decision to quit a treaty.”20 As a practical matter, however, the benefits 
of giving reasons are considerable. Exit, whether from treaties or custom, 
creates a variety of institutional, legal, political, and reputational costs.21 
These costs can be reduced if the withdrawing state “uses the formal pre-
exit notice period or informal statements to explain its decision to quit the 
treaty.”22 Such an explanation may, for example, identify unforeseen 
circumstances that make compliance with custom unduly costly. Or it may 
induce other countries to shift to a different equilibrium rule.23 These 
benefits notwithstanding, there is insufficient state practice to compel a 
withdrawing state to issue an explanation as a condition of exit. In addition, 
even the few treaties that require such a justification make it self-judging.24 
Applying the same mandatory disclosure requirement to CIL would thus do 
little to deter opportunistic withdrawals. 
 
 19. See generally ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1971); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000). 
 20. Helfer, supra note 3, at 1598. In addition, most notices of denunciation are “short, stylized 
letters of two or three paragraphs that simply inform the treaty depository that a state is withdrawing 
from a particular agreement as of a specified date.” Id. 
 21. Id. at 1613-29; see also Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in 
International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 379 (2010) (discussing the distributional implications of exit 
costs for powerful and weaker states). 
 22. Helfer, supra note 3, at 1627. 
 23. Id. at 1635-36 (explaining how threats of unilateral denunciation accompanied by 
justifications can help to move treaty parties to a more efficient multilateral treaty rules). 
 24. See Abram Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 905, 957-58 (1972) (explaining that justifications for unilateral denunciation of arms control 
agreements are “referred exclusively to the unilateral decision of the withdrawing party”). 
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II. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRAINTS ON EXIT FROM  
TREATIES AND CIL 
The law of treaties imposes a number of substantive limitations on the 
denunciation of multilateral agreements. These include presumptions 
against partial withdrawal and against exit from treaties that neither 
prohibit nor permit unilateral opt outs. A closely related issue concerns the 
types of treaties—and, by analogy, customary rules—whose subject matter 
implies a ban on denunciation or withdrawal unless states expressly agree 
to the contrary. 
Vienna Convention Article 44 regulates partial denunciations.25 It 
adopts a general rule of “indivisibility of treaty provisions while 
circumscribing . . . the conditions for the exceptional severance of 
individual provisions and clauses.”26 The result is a presumption that exit 
rights “may be exercised only with respect to the whole treaty.”27 This rule 
is entirely sensible. Multilateral agreements, both those regulating a single 
topic (such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families) and those that 
codify grand bargains (such as the WTO Agreements) are package deals 
that embody hard-fought compromises among government negotiators.28 If 
a ratifying state could exit from only those provisions of the package that it 
disfavors, international cooperation would quickly degenerate into tit-for-
tat retaliation.29 
The presumption against severability applies with equal force to CIL. 
The presumption is easiest to apply to custom that is derived from 
widespread acceptance of multilateral agreements and whose content 
mirrors the provisions of those agreements.30 Where treaties and custom are 
 
 25. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 44(1) (“A right of a party, provided for in a treaty or 
arising under article 56, to denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may be 
exercised only with respect to the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties 
otherwise agree.”). 
 26. See VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 562, 654-67; Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 44, ¶¶ 2 -3 
(describing the exceptions, which include partial withdrawals in response to another party’s breach, and 
withdrawals whose grounds relate solely to particular, severable clauses of the treaty that were not an 
essential basis of the consent of the other parties). 
 27. VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 564. 
 28. But see Withdrawing from International Custom, supra note 1, at 270 (“[T]reaties vary 
substantially in the extent to which they involve a package of rules.”). 
 29. See generally Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) (noting that this risk is most acute for treaties 
that prohibit reservations but that even treaties that expressly or implicitly permit reservations do so 
only for particular clauses or if reservations are consistent with the agreement’s object and purpose). 
 30. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (6th ed. 2008); Bing Bing Jia, The 
Relations between Treaties and Custom, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 81 (2010). 
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coterminous, states should be precluded from partially withdrawing from 
CIL to the same extent as they would be barred from partially denouncing 
the underlying agreement upon which that custom is based. 
The presumption may be more difficult to apply to other areas of CIL, 
in particular where it is uncertain whether state practice and opinio juris 
have created a single, indivisible custom or two or more discrete customary 
rules. Consider the two 1945 Truman Proclamations, issued on the same 
day and widely acknowledged as the trigger for new CIL relating to the law 
of the sea.31 Each proclamation laid claim to a different resource—an 
exclusive economic zone in the high seas and the continental shelf that lies 
beneath them. Later assertions of control by other coastal nations varied in 
their content and scope. But their claims to both resources, like those 
asserted by the United States, tended to go hand in hand.32 Were these 
distinct customary rules or a single omnibus custom? The codification of 
both practices in a comprehensive multilateral convention mooted this 
question.33 For non-codified areas of CIL, however, government officials 
and commentators will need to reexamine historical sources to evaluate the 
severability issue. If two customary practices are distinct rather than 
interrelated, the state’s withdrawal from one will not alter its continuing 
obligations with respect to the other.34 
A second and more convoluted substantive limitation on exit arises for 
a treaty that contains no provisions for termination, denunciation or 
withdrawal. Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that such an 
agreement “is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) It is 
established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation 
or withdrawal; or (b) A right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied 
by the nature of the treaty.”35 
In 1997, North Korea attempted to denounce the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is silent as to the 
 
 31. See Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 39-40 (1943-1948); Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 40-
41 (1943-1948); Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 830, 832 (2006). 
 32. See Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS Property 
Law (And What Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 241, 253-55 (2007). 
 33. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 34. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 43 (“The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a 
treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it . . . shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil 
[sic] any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law 
independently of the treaty.”). 
 35. Id. art. 56(1). 
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possibility of exit.36 In response, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the 
expert body that monitors compliance with the treaty, issued a general 
comment concluding that the ICCPR was not capable of denunciation or 
withdrawal.37 Tracking Article 56’s two-part inquiry, the Committee first 
explained that the absence of an exit clause was not oversight, inasmuch as 
the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol and other contemporaneously-
negotiated human rights conventions expressly provided for withdrawal.38 
It then reasoned that the rights protected by the ICCPR “belong to the 
people living in the territory of the State party” and cannot be divested by 
changes in government or state succession.39 As a result, the treaty “does 
not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a right of 
denunciation is deemed to be admitted, notwithstanding the absence of a 
specific provision to that effect.”40 
The above reasoning suggests that customary human rights law should 
be exempt from unilateral withdrawal. Bradley and Gulati support this 
result, citing the Committee’s general comment as an example of “agency 
problems” in which “governments will want to opt out even though it 
would be better for their populations if they did not.”41 The authors confine 
this justification for closing exit to “international law that is focused on 
certain fundamental rights of individuals (such as jus cogens norms), rather 
than on more traditional interstate issues.”42 But the line between these two 
types of custom is often difficult to draw in practice. In fact, agency 
problems can arise whenever CIL recognizes private actors as rights 
holders or third party beneficiaries of international obligations, including in 
areas as diverse as humanitarian law, protection of aliens, and preservation 
of the environment. Whether CIL should permit exit that adversely affects 
the rights and interests of private parties thus raises important normative 
questions that the authors do not fully address. 
Bradley and Gulati also discuss other possible rationales supporting 
the mandatory view of custom, including the reliance interests of other 
nations, rule of law and legitimacy concerns, and externalities. They 
demonstrate, persuasively in my view, that these justifications do not 
support a categorical ban on CIL withdrawals. This is all that is necessary 
 
 36. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1, ¶ 1 (Dec. 8, 1997). 
 37. Id. ¶ 5. 
 38. Id. ¶ 2. 
 39. Id. ¶ 4. 
 40. Id. ¶ 3. 
 41. Withdrawing from International Custom, supra note 1, at 266. 
 42. Id. at 267. 
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for the authors to critique the conventional wisdom that CIL should never 
bar unilateral opt outs. But it leaves unresolved the much harder question of 
when to permit or preclude such opt outs under the default view of CIL that 
would replace it. 
The analogy to treaties sheds additional light on this question, 
although it does not conclusively answer it. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
International Law Commission prepared reports on the law of treaties that 
eventually resulted in the adoption of the Vienna Convention.43 One issue 
that divided the special rapporteurs who drafted these studies was whether 
states could exit from a treaty that did not contain an express denunciation 
or withdrawal clause. In his 1957 report, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote that, 
in the absence of such a provision, it should be assumed that such a treaty 
is intended to be of “indefinite duration, and only terminable . . . by mutual 
agreement on the part of all the parties.”44 But Fitzmaurice also 
acknowledged, albeit somewhat grudgingly, the existence of several 
exceptions: 
This assumption, however, may be negatived in any case (a) by 
necessary inference to be derived from the terms of the treaty 
generally, indicating its expiry in certain events, or an intention to 
permit unilateral termination or withdrawal; (b) should the treaty 
belong to a class in respect of which, ex naturae, a faculty of unilateral 
termination or withdrawal must be deemed to exist for the parties if the 
contrary is not indicated—such as treaties of alliance, or treaties of a 
commercial character.45 
Sir Humphrey Waldock revisited the issue six years later. His report 
included a detailed draft article on “treaties containing no provisions 
regarding their duration and termination.”46 Waldock disagreed with 
Fitzmaurice that there was a general presumption against exit from treaties 
that lack a withdrawal or denunciation clause, and he reviewed state 
practice to identify the types of agreements for which exit was or was not 
permitted. The former category included: 
(i) a commercial or trading treaty, other than one establishing an 
international regime for a particular area, river or waterway; (ii) a 
treaty of alliance or of military co-operation . . . ; (iii) a treaty for 
technical co-operation in economic, social, cultural, scientific, 
 
 43. International Law Commission, Law of Treaties, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/1_1.htm (last 
visited August 15, 2010) (listing texts, instruments and final reports adopted by the Commission). 
 44. Second Fitzmaurice Report, supra note 6, at 22. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Second Waldock Report, supra note 6, at 64. 
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communications or any other such matters . . . ; (iv) a treaty of 
arbitration, conciliation or judicial settlement [and] “a treaty which is 
the constituent instrument of an international organization.”47 
In contrast, Waldock asserted that a treaty “shall continue in force 
indefinitely” if it: 
(a) is one establishing a boundary between two States, or effecting a 
cession of territory or a grant of rights in or over territory; (b) is one 
establishing a special international regime for a particular area, 
territory, river, waterway, or airspace; (c) is a treaty of peace, a treaty 
of disarmament, or for the maintenance of peace; (d) is one effecting a 
final settlement of an international dispute; (e) is a general multilateral 
treaty providing for the codification or progressive development of 
general international law . . . .48 
Agreements not referenced in either list would be subject to a 
presumption against withdrawal “unless it clearly appears from the nature 
of the treaty or the circumstances of its conclusion that it was intended to 
have only a temporary application.”49 
Waldock’s proposed typology was controversial and it divided the 
members of the International Law Commission and the Vienna 
Convention’s drafters.50 The result was the ambiguous compromise 
reflected in Article 56(1), quoted above, which refers to the parties’ (often 
unwritten) intent and to the treaty’s (undefined) nature. Nevertheless, many 
commentators continue to consult the Waldock report for guidance 
concerning the types of treaties that implicitly preclude or permit 
withdrawal, albeit with some modern adjustments.51 
What insights do the two Commission reports and the drafting history 
of Article 56 offer for the issue of CIL withdrawal? One possibility would 
be to have exit rules for custom parallel the rules that Waldock proposed 
for treaties that contain no denunciation or withdrawal clause. This 
approach may appear to have the virtue of uniformly regulating all 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. MALGOSIA FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 357 (2005). 
 51. For example, Waldock does not list human rights treaties as not subject to denunciation or 
withdrawal in the absence of an express exit clause. This is unsurprising given that, at the time of his 
report in 1962, only a small number of multilateral agreements protecting fundamental rights had been 
adopted. Present-day commentators have remedied this omission. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 290-91 (2d ed. 2007); VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 703. 
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international laws that govern a given issue area.52 In reality, however, 
Waldock’s treaty typology (or any other, for that matter) cannot be so 
easily transferred to the realm of state practice and opinio juris. The 
categories that Waldock proposed were residual rules to be applied only if 
the parties deviated from the far more common practice of including exit 
clauses in the agreements they negotiated.53 Under the mandatory view of 
CIL that currently prevails, there is no analogous opportunity for states to 
indicate that a given custom permits unilateral withdrawal. Transposing 
Waldock’s typology to CIL would therefore result in a far more radical 
restructuring of the international legal system, since the typology would 
have the practical effect of dictating which areas of custom are amenable to 
exit and which are not. 
An alternative approach, applying Article 56(1) of the Vienna 
Convention to CIL, fairs little better. It is meaningless to ask whether states 
“intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal,” because, 
under the present mandatory view of CIL, they simply never considered 
that question. And it is equally futile to ask whether “the nature” of a 
particular custom implies a right of exit, since the nature of all modern CIL 
is that it binds all states except for persistent objectors, and that it continues 
to do so until it is abrogated by a new custom or by treaty.54 
How, then, should one determine the substantive constraints on 
unilateral withdrawals from custom? Bradley and Gulati do not answer this 
question, reserving for a future project the development of “a typology that 
would match more or less permissive opt out rules to particular areas of 
CIL.”55 The authors do, however, offer a few “guidelines” for such a 
project. The most promising of these, in my view, are their suggestions (1) 
to “take account of the functional cooperation problems that different areas 
of CIL attempt to solve, some of which are likely to require more 
mandatory regimes than others;” (2) to consider agency problems for 
customary rules that protect the “fundamental rights of individuals;” and 
(3) “to treat certain structural or background principles as mandatory.”56 
These guidelines, which implicate foundational principles of how to 
 
 52. Cf. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 271 (suggesting that “limitations and variations [on CIL 
withdrawal rights] might be drawn from treaties that address the same subject matter as the CIL rule”). 
 53. Second Waldock Report, supra note 6, at 64-65 (“A large proportion of modern treaties, . . . 
especially multilateral treaties, do contain provisions . . . providing for a right of denunciation or 
withdrawal . . . .”). 
 54. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 211-13 (noting these canonical rules and citing 
authorities). 
 55. Id. at 273. 
 56. Id. at 273, 267, 274. 
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structure the international legal system, require more extended analysis 
than I can provide in this brief Essay. Scholars considering these important 
issues would do well to consult the International Law Commission reports 
on treaty withdrawals, less for their specific examples than to help identify 
the types of cooperation, agency, and structural problems that are 
appropriately regulated through mandatory rules of international custom. 
III. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXIT FROM  
TREATIES AND CIL 
In addition to imposing the substantive constraints on unilateral 
withdrawal, the law of treaties regulates the legal consequences of exit for 
the withdrawing state and for the countries that remain parties to a treaty 
following that state’s departure. Article 70 of the Vienna Convention 
provides that a nation that denounces or withdraws from a multilateral 
treaty is released “from any obligation further to perform” the treaty “from 
the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.”57 Article 70 
further provides, however, that the denunciation or withdrawal “does not 
affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through 
the execution of the treaty prior to” the effective date.58 
Commentators agree that these provisions, which predate the Vienna 
Convention and were adopted unanimously by its drafters, are declaratory 
of customary international law.59 Nevertheless, a few multilateral treaties, 
in particular human rights and humanitarian law agreements, expressly 
reiterate that an exiting state’s obligations continue until the date that its 
denunciation or withdrawal takes effect. Article 78(2) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights is illustrative.60 It provides that a 
denunciation “shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party 
concerned from the obligations contained in this Convention with respect 
to any act that may constitute a violation of those obligations and that has 
been taken by that state prior to the effective date of denunciation.”61 
The Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights have 
issued several decisions interpreting and applying Article 78. On May 26, 
1998, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention in 
 
 57. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 70(1)(a), 70(2). 
 58. Id. art. 70(1)(b). These provisions apply “unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties 
otherwise agree.” Id. art. 70(1). 
 59. See VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 869, 875; see also AUST, supra note 51, at 303. 
 60. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 78(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
144-63 (entered into force July 18, 1978). 
 61. Id. 
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response to domestic and international challenges to its application of the 
death penalty.62 Pursuant to the one-year notice rule in Article 78(1), the 
denunciation was effective on May 26, 1999. Both during the twelve month 
window and thereafter, numerous defendants on death row in Trinidad filed 
complaints with the Inter-American Commission.63 In addition, one day 
before the denunciation took effect, the Commission lodged an appeal with 
the Inter-American Court concerning other death row defendants whose 
cases the Commission had previously reviewed.64 
In a 2001 decision, the Commission considered whether it had 
jurisdiction to review these complaints.65 It first reiterated that, under the 
“plain terms of Article 78(2),” a denunciation does “not release the 
denouncing state from its obligations under the Convention with respect to 
acts taken by that state prior to the effective date of the denunciation that 
may constitute a violation of those obligations.”66 The Commission then 
defined the denouncing state’s “obligations” as encompassing not only 
the substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed [by the American 
Convention, but also] provisions relating to the supervisory 
mechanisms under the Convention, including those . . . relating to the 
jurisdiction, functions and powers of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. Notwithstanding Trinidad and Tobago’s 
denunciation of the Convention, therefore, the Commission will retain 
jurisdiction over complaints of violations of the Convention by 
Trinidad and Tobago in respect of acts taken by that State prior to 
May 26, 1999. Consistent with established jurisprudence, this includes 
acts taken by the State prior to May 26, 1999, even if the effects of 
those acts continue or are not manifested until after that date.67 
In Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin v. Trinidad and Tobago, the 
Inter-American Court accepted jurisdiction over complaints by death row 
 
 62. For additional analysis, see Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
 63. See id. at 1882. 
 64. See Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Activities from 
Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 651, 688-89 (2003); Natasha Parassram 
Concepcion, Note, The Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago's Withdrawal From the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 847, 872-73 (2001). 
 65. Roodal v. Trinidad & Tobago, Case 12.342, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 89/01, 
OEA/Ser. L./V/II.114, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 4 (2001), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2001eng/ 
TT12342.htm. 
 66. Id. ¶ 23. 
 67. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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defendants alleging violations that occurred prior to the denunciation.68 
Although the Court did not address the issue in depth, it “appears to have 
shared the Commission’s interpretation of Article 78” inasmuch as its 
ruling involved “petitions [that] were lodged with the Commission after the 
effective date of Trinidad’s denunciation.”69 Decisions by the ICJ and the 
European Commission of Human Rights have reached similar 
conclusions.70 
These principles should also apply to an international legal regime in 
which a state can unilaterally exit from CIL. As proposed in Part I, such a 
state must provide at least one year notice to every other nation that may be 
adversely affected by its withdrawal. During this notice period, the exiting 
country’s legal obligations continue unabated. In addition, the state remains 
responsible for breaches of CIL that occurred prior to or during the notice 
period—even after it has successfully opted out. Taken together, these rules 
prevent nations from using exit as a tactic to avoid accountability for past 
violations of CIL. They also deter precipitous and opportunistic 
withdrawals in which a state opts out and then immediately acts contrary to 
a custom that it had previously accepted as legally binding. 
One issue that Vienna Convention Article 70 does not address is how 
nations injured by a withdrawing state’s pre-exit breach are to obtain a 
remedy for that violation.71 In the case of treaties that establish an 
international court or review body, aggrieved countries can file complaints 
against the exiting state even after it has quit the treaty.72 For CIL 
violations, by contrast, no international tribunal may have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the dispute.73 The absence of an international judicial forum 
 
 68. See Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80, ¶ 28 
(Sep. 1, 2001); Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, ¶¶ 12-20 (June 21, 2002). 
 69. Brian D. Tittemore, The Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the 
Inter-American Human Rights System: An Evolution in the Development and Implementation of 
International Human Rights Protections, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 445, 474-75 n.129 (2004). 
 70. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing decisions of the European Commission); 
VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 869 n.4 (citing ICJ judgments). 
 71. See VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 873-74. 
 72. For example, the Inter-American Commission has continued to accept petitions alleging 
violations of the American Convention that occurred prior to May 26, 1999, the effective date of 
Trinidad & Tobago’s denunciation. See, e.g., Ramlogan v. Trinidad and Tobago, Case 12.355, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 48/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 5 at 426 (2002), available at http:// 
www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/TT.12355.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). 
 73. If both the complainant and respondent states have filed declarations recognizing the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction without any applicable reservations, then that court will be empowered to 
adjudicate the dispute. However, only 66 countries have filed such declarations, often with expansive 
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does not, however, negate the breaching state’s continuing obligation to 
make reparation, nor does it preclude the aggrieved nations from using 
diplomacy, negotiation or other forms of dispute settlement to pursue their 
legal claims.74 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has analyzed the substantive and procedural constraints on 
unilateral exit from multilateral treaties and has argued that these 
restrictions should apply with equal force if the international legal system 
were revised to permit unilateral exit from CIL in certain circumstances. 
The Essay has also considered the continuing obligations that an exiting 
nation has to other states parties, even after it quits a treaty. These 
obligations should also apply to proposals to permit unilateral withdrawals 
from international custom. Taken together, this suite of legal constraints on 
exit should alleviate, at least in part, fears that a relaxation of the 
mandatory view of CIL will necessarily destabilize international law. 
In addition to legal restrictions on treaty exit, numerous institutional, 
political, and reputational costs deter states from quitting treaties.75 There is 
no reason to expect that these costs would be appreciably lower if states 
could withdraw from CIL. There is, however, a more important reason to 
reject a categorical ban on CIL withdrawals. An exit option may actually 
“enhance interstate cooperation” by “provid[ing] the security states need to 
negotiate more extensive international commitments or encourage 
ratification by a larger number of nations—outcomes that are often 
essential to resolving genuinely global transborder problems.”76 In 
identifying the cooperation-enhancing features of exiting custom, Bradley 
and Gulati have developed a thought-provoking proposal that, if 
appropriately cabined by constraints analogous to those that limit exiting 
treaties, may better serve the ends of world order. 
 
 
reservations. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). 
 74. See VILLIGER, supra note 7, at 873-74. 
 75. See Helfer, supra note 3, at 1613-29. 
 76. Id. at 1647. 
